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Abstract
We reconstruct Cohen, March and Olsen’s Garbage Can model of organiza-
tional choice as an agent-based model. In the original model, the members of an
organization can postpone decision-making. We add another means for avoiding
making decisions, that of buck-passing difficult problems to colleagues. We find
that selfish individual behavior, such as postponing decision-making and buck-
passing, does not necessarily imply dysfunctional consequences for the organiza-
tional level.
The simulation experiments confirm and extend some of the most interesting
conclusions of the Garbage Can model: Most decisions are made without solving
any problem, organization members face the same old problems again and again,
and the few problems that are solved are generally handled at low hierarchical
levels. These findings have an implication that was overseen in the original model,
namely, that top executives need not be good problem-solvers.
Keywords: Organizational Decision Making, Garbage Can Model, Postponing De-
cisions, Buck-Passing
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1 Introduction
The Garbage Can Model of organizational decision-making proposed by Cohen, March
and Olsen in 1972 (henceforth GCM) [4] is possibly the most widely cited article in
simulation-based Organization Science. It is also the best known example of a piece
of organizational theory developed through computer simulation. In the original arti-
cle, verbal theoretical statements are followed by a fairly detailed explanation of the
corresponding lines of computer code, and these details entail important theoretical as-
sumptions. Simulation results are presented as the implications of the theory, and the
code is made publicly available as an appendix.
However, in the subsequent decades the example of the GCM has been rarely im-
itated. A large parte of Organization Theory ignored Computational Science, and the
GCM itself has been seldom discussed in its computational details. Its conclusions
have been quoted as pertaining to a paradoxical world, and the GCM has been under-
stood as the prototype of what an organization should not be.
With this article we want to show that the GCM highlights surprising but logical
consequences of sensible assumptions, and that both assumptions and consequences
are deeply rooted in organizational theory and practice. We do so by re-writing the
GCM as an agent-based model, which is a straightforward operation because the GCM
is perhaps the first example of an organization theory developed explicitly through
hypotheses about the behavior of discrete objects (our agents) rather than hypotheses
on relations among variables.
In reproducing the original GCM we realized that the original model is at the same
time incomplete and redundant. It is incomplete in the scope of the hierarchical struc-
tures that it assumes, and at the same time redundant in the kinds of structures that it
allows to the experimenter. The model is also redundant in the number of indicators
that it adopts as measures of performance. We corrected these obvious shortcomings
by limiting the model to those structures that produce interesting results, by enabling
all agents in the model to adopt these structures, and by devising a minimum number
of indicators that capture all interesting properties of the model.
The original GCM has a means for avoiding a difficult problem, which consists of
attaching it to another opportunity for decision-making. We interpreted this mechanism
as postponing decision-making, and we remarked that the literature [10] has identified
two means for avoiding a difficult problem, namely, (i) postponing decision-making,
and (ii) passing it to someone else. The original GCM did not implement buck-passing,
but our agent-based GCM can easily do it. We found the surprising implication that or-
ganizations may be more similar to markets than previously thought. In fact, it appears
that selfish behavior, such as postponing decisions as well as buck-passing, may be
beneficial for the organization as a whole. As in the case of markets, a kind of invisible
hand seems to be at work.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section (2) describes the main
features of the original GCM, while section (3) expounds our agent-based setting. Sec-
tion (4) illustrates our extensions to the basic GCM. Section (5) points to the new issues
that our extended GCM identifies and allows to investigate. Section (6) illustrates our
results. Finally, section (7) discusses our results and embeds them within wider con-
siderations.
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2 Cohen, March and Olsen’s Garbage Can
According to Cohen, March and Olsen [4], Garbage Can -like decision situations are
induced by the simultaneous presence of three elements. The first is fluid participa-
tion. Fluid participation means that the attention that participants typically dedicate to
any one issue is highly variable. This notion also captures the observation that orga-
nizational members tend to enter and exit decision situations according to processes
that are not necessarily related to the problems at hand. The second factor is unclear
decision technology. Unclear decision technology refers to the fact that causal rela-
tions underlying specific organizational decision problems are frequently ambiguous,
and only ex-post are reconstructed in the form of well specified means-end chains [11]
[13]. The third factor is problematic preferences, a term that Cohen, March and Olsen
introduced to capture the general tendency of decision makers to discover their pref-
erences through action rather than acting on the basis of pre-defined and unchanging
preferences [4]. Organizations characterized by fluid participation, unclear decision
technologies and problematic preferences were labeled by Cohen, March and Olsen
“organized anarchies” [4].
Four classes of agents populate the GCM: participants (decision-makers), choice
opportunities, solutions and problems. All these agents exist independently of one an-
other and, although they might disappear as a consequence of decision-making, their
existence is independent of time. Note that the assumption that solutions exist inde-
pendently of problems is a clear departure from the assumptions of rational decision-
making, implying that solutions are schemes that decision-makers apply to any problem
they meet rather than specific responses to specific problems.
According to the GCM, decision situations characterized by fluid participation,
unclear decision technology and problematic preferences generate three possible out-
comes, only two of which are decision styles: 1
• The first decision style is characterized by the fact that a problem is actually
solved. This is called decicion-making by resolution. It is the only decision style
considered legitimate by the theory of rational decision-making [16]. Accord-
ing to the GCM, decisions are made by resolution if: (i) the participants to the
decision process are sufficiently able; (ii) a sufficiently efficient solution is avail-
able to them, and (iii) the problems that they are called to solve are sufficiently
simple.
• The second decision style is defined by decisions that are made without any
attention to existing problems. It is just sufficient that a participant, a choice
1Our interpretation of resolution, oversights and flights rests on the verbal description of the GCM made
by Cohen, March and Olsen at the beginning of their paper [4]. Subsequently, Cohen, March and Olsen
start to call flights “a third decision style.” This happens because, at a certain point, they assume that
all flights generate resolutions: “Some choices involve both flight and resolution — some problems leave,
the remainder are solved. These have been defined as resolution, thus slightly exagerating the importance
of that style. As a result of that convention, the three styles are mutually exclusive and exhaustive with
respect to any one choice.” We shall see that assuming that all flights cause resolutions is by no means
a “slight exageration.” Apart from this, calling flights “a decision style” creates a sharp divide between
the introductory conceptual claims and the computational model. This confusion is responsible of many
misunderstandings in the subsequent litterature.
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opportunity and a solution are there: no problem is solved, because no prob-
lem is considered. Cohen, March and Olsen called this decision style by over-
sight. We interpret decisions by oversight as due rituals that confirm the legiti-
macy of an organization, as highlighted by the neo-institutional litterature [12]
[7]. They make sense because any organization is embedded in a wider society,
that requires them. As a typical example one may think of a firm that complies
with screening procedures in order to obtain a favorable classification by a rating
agency, though these procedures do not provide any immediate benefit. More in
general, compliance to safety, environmental, fiscal and many other institutional
rules helps gaining acceptance, recognition and trust by stockholders, banks, the
Government and the general public.
The third outcome, flight, is no decision in itself. It is a means to escape from too
difficult a problem.
In Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM, participants shy away from a difficult problem
by removing the most difficult problem from the agenda of the current choice oppor-
tunity to attach it to another choice opportunity, one that will be due at a later time.
We interpret this procedure as postponing decision-making. Once the most difficult
problem is no longer under consideration, a participant can easily make a decision on
the remaining problems.
The participants in the GCM are characterized by an “ability” as as decision-
makers 2, the solutions are endowed with “efficiency”, and problems have a “diffi-
culty” 3. Let Ai denote the ability of the ith participant. Let e j denote the efficiency
of the jth solution. Let Dk denote the difficulty of the kth problem. Let us consider a
generic opportunity for decision-making and let us denote it by an index l.
A decision is made by resolution if at least one participant, at least one solution and
at least one problem are attached to opportunity l, and if the sum of the abilities of these
participants, multiplied by the efficiency of the most efficient among these solutions, is
greater than or equal to the sum of the difficulties of these problems:(
∑
I∈Il
Ai
)
max
j∈Jl
e j ≥ ∑
k∈Kl
Dk (1)
where Il is the set of participants on opportunity l, Jl is the set of solutions on oppor-
tunity l and Kl is the set of problems on opportunity l.
In contrast, a decision is made by oversight if at least one participant and at least
one solution are attached to opportunity l, but no problem is attached to l. Neither
the ability of participants nor the efficiency of solutions matter in this case. If several
solutions are available, one of them is selected at random.
There remains the case where at least one participant, at least one solution and at
least one problem are attached to opportunity l, but condition 1 is not satisfied. In this
case, participants are blocked on an opportunity plagued by too difficult problems.
On such occasions, participants may decide to get rid of difficult problems. A flight
occurs when participants succeed to attach the most difficult problem to a different
2
“Ability” was actually called “energy” in the original model
3
“Difficulty” was also called “energy” in the original model
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opportunity. If the remaining problems are sufficiently simple, a decision is then made
by resolution. If no problem is left after the flight, a decision is made by oversight.
If the remaining problems are still sufficiently difficult to block any decision, another
flight will be attempted on the next occasion.
The basic GCM described so far has no organizational structure in any conventional
sense. In order to overcome this shortcoming Cohen, March and Olsen devised the
possibility that either opportunities and participants, or opportunities and problems, or
all of them together, receive an exogenous ordering by “importance”. The decision
structure specifies which participants are allowed to make a decision in which choice
opportunities (e.g., only the directors may be allowed to attend the board of directors).
The access structure specifies which problems can access which opportunities (e.g.,
shop-floor problems may not be allowed to reach the CEO).
3 An Agent-Based Garbage Can Model
The computational model designed by Cohen, March and Olsen [4] has been criti-
cized for being a loose mapping of the underlying theoretical narrative [1]. In fact,
the computational model does not have an independent set of solutions (only partici-
pants, opportunities and problems interact), it is tailored to a very special sequence of
opportunities and problems entering the organization and, most importantly, it is de-
signed so that at each step all participants and all problems will converge on one single
opportunity.
Given these deficiencies, all conclusions concerning the meetings of participants
and problems do not emerge out of the theoretical assumptions but are hard-wired in
the model [1]. Furthermore, the emergent properties of the model may not correspond
to its theoretical assumptions. Thus, we set out to design a computational model where
participants, opportunities, solutions and problems are autonomous agents that interact
in a virtual space as the verbal statements of the GCM suggest.
In our view, a substantial part of the deficiencies of the original implementation of
the GCM stem from the fact that it is a piece of procedural code (FORTRAN). In 1972,
this was this was the only possible choice. However, the GCM has a feature that makes
it quite ahead of its time. Rather than specifying a set of equations, it defines a set of
agents that interact with one another: the participants, the opportunities, the solutions
and the problems. Two decades in advance, the GCM was specified as an agent-based
model, and we claim that an agent-based implementation is more faithful to the spirit
of the GCM than the original procedural implementation of Cohen, March and Olsen
[4].
An agent-based implementation allows to represent decision-making as random en-
counters of basic components as envisioned by Cohen, March and Olsen’s verbal the-
ory. In this setting, it is easy to avoid the simplifications and unwarranted assumptions
that plague the original implementation.
In our agent-based GCM, participants, opportunities, solutions and problems are
placed on a torus. A lattice is superimposed on the torus; agents are necessarily at
the center of the lattice square where they are. Agents eventually move by one square
during one simulation step, either north, east, west or south of their current position.
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Agents meet if they find themselves on the same square. If at least one participant,
an opportunity and at least one solution are on the same square, and no problem is
there, then a decision by oversight is made. If it happens that at least one participant,
an opportunity, at least one solution and at least one problem are on the same position,
and the inequality 1 is satisfied, then a decision is made by resolution.
If, on the contrary, the ability of participants is not sufficient given the difficulty of
problems and the efficiency of solutions, then decision-making is blocked. As we shall
see in the ensuing § (4), a blocked decision process may be unlocked by a flight.
Our computational tool enables a thorough exploration of the GCM-style of decision-
making. The user of the model can choose whether participants, opportunities, solu-
tions or problems exit the organization after a decision is made. Exogenous in- or
outflows of participants, opportunities, solutions and problems can be added to the en-
dogenous dynamics of the model. Ability, difficulty and efficiency can be distributed
to participants, problems and solutions according to several deterministic or stochastic
criteria. Finally, hierarchical structures can be imposed on the basic model.
Our agent-based model is based on the NetLogo platform. 4 A detailed description
of the commands is available in the “Information” section of our simulator, as well as
in [8], publicly available on-line. The ensuing § (4) explains what features pertain to
the original GCM and what improve on it.
4 Theoretical Improvements
Besides transposing the original GCM in an agent-based framework, we improved on
it in two respects. The first one concerns the structures that can be imposed upon the
model. The second one concerns the mechanism by which flights take place.
4.1 Anarchies and Hierarchies
In the original GCM, certain exogenous structures could be imposed upon the model.
First, opportunities, participants and problems were ranked. Subsequently, one could
eventually forbid participants of lower rank to exploit opportunities of higher rank (de-
cision structure), or forbid problems of lower rank to be handled in opportunities of
higher rank (access structure). In both cases, imposing a structure means specifying
what participants and problems of given rank can do with respect to opportunities of
given rank.
Symmetry and completeness require that a similar structure can be imposed to solu-
tions as well. Thus, we introduced an availability structure that specifies what solutions
are available on what opportunities.
Once participants, opportunities, solutions and problems are ranked the following
structures can be imposed on our new agent-based version of the GCM:
4NetLogo is available at: <http:// ccl.northwestern.edu/ netlogo>. The code of our model is available on
the NetLogo web site under the rubric NetLogo User Community Models, as well as on a web page devoted
to computer code for the GCM: <http:// www.cs.unibo.it/ ∼fioretti/ garbageCan>. The code is distributed
under the GNU public license.
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Decision Structure A decision structure specifies which opportunities each partici-
pant is allowed to explore;
Availability Structure An availability structure specifies which solutions can be avail-
able at each opportunity;
Access Structure An access structure specifies which opportunities can be accessed
by each problem.
In our new agent-based version of the GCM, each of these structures can take one
of the following forms:
Anarchy A decision structure is an anarchy if any participant is allowed to make de-
cisions on any choice opportunity. An availability structure is an anarchy if any
solution can be employed in any choice opportunity. An access structure is an
anarchy if any problem can access any opportunity.
Hierarchy A decision structure is a hierarchy if participants are only allowed to make
decisions on choice opportunities that are equally or less important than their
own hierarchical level. An availability structure is a hierarchy if solutions are
only allowed to enter choice opportunities that are equally or less important than
their own hierarchical level. An access structure is a hierarchy if problems are
only allowed to access opportunities that are equally or less important than their
own hierarchical level.
Figure (1) illustrates a decision structure, an availability structure and an access
structure for an anarchy and a hierarchy, respectively. As in Cohen, March and Olsen’s
GCM, structuring requires that there are at least as many opportunities as participants,
solutions and problems, respectively.
Both the anarchy (with the name of “non-segmented structure”) and the hierar-
chy existed in Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM [4]. We deem that “anarchy” is an
apprpriate name, also because called the organizational arrangement ensuing from a
non-segmented structure an “organized anarchy”.
Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM included also a third possibility, called “special-
ized structure”. If the decision structure was specialized, partcipants were allowed to
make decisions on opportunities of exactly their same rank, but not on opportunities of
lower rank. The specialized access structure had a similar meaning. We dropped spe-
cialized structures after checking that they do not yield qualitatively different results
from hierarchical structures [8] [9].
Drawing from the original model by Cohen, March and Olsen [4], we consider
the three following distributions of ability, efficiency and difficulty in our improved
agent-based GCM:
Random Abilities are randomly distributed to participants according to a uniform dis-
tribution. Efficiencies are randomly distributed to solutions according to a uni-
form distribution. Difficulties are randomly distributed to problems according to
a uniform distribution.
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Figure 1: In the decision structure, ones (zeros) mean that the participant in the cor-
responding row is (not) allowed to make a decision in the opportunity on the corre-
sponding column. In the availability structure, ones (zeros) mean that the solution in
the corresponding row can (not) be used in the opportunity on the corresponding col-
umn. In the access structure, ones (zeros) mean that the problem in the corresponding
row can (not) be handled in the opportunity on the corresponding column. The fig-
ure illustrates an example with six participants, six opportunities, six solutions and six
problems.
8
Competence If a hierarchical structure is imposed on participants, those participants
that are higher up in the hierarchy have the greatest ability. If a hierarchical struc-
ture is imposed on solutions, those solutions that are higher up in the hierarchy
have the greatest efficiency. If a hierarchical structure is imposed on problems,
those problems that are higher up in the hierarchy have the greatest difficulty.
Incompetence If a hierarchical structure is imposed on participants, those participants
that are higher up in the hierarchy have the lowest ability. If a hierarchical struc-
ture is imposed on solutions, those solutions that are higher up in the hierarchy
have the lowest efficiency. If a hierarchical structure is imposed on problems,
those problems that are higher up in the hierarchy have the lowest difficulty.
The random distribution is an extension of the case where, in Cohen, March and
Olsen’s GCM [4], all participants had the same ability, all solutions had the same ef-
ficiency (represented by an aggregate efficiency coefficient), and all problems had the
same difficulty 5. Cohen, March and Olsen’s case can be obtained by selecting the
same values for the two extremes of the uniform random distribution.
The distribution by competence 6 implements the way ability, efficiency and dif-
ficulty should be assigned according to common wisdom, i.e., those participants who
are high in a hierarchy should be the most able to solve problems, the most efficient
solutions should be available to them, and these people should be concerned with the
most difficult problems. In the original GCM efficiency could not be assigned by com-
petence, for solutions were subsumed by an aggregate coefficient. It appears that en-
dowing the GCM with heterogeneous solutions is a due extension, which brings the
GCM closer to its verbal theoretical statements.
The distribution by incompetence 7 implements the opposite rationale, i.e., those
participants who are high up in a hierarchy should be the least able to solve problems,
only the least efficient solutions should be available to them, and these people should
be only concerned with the least difficult problems. These arrangements may seem
paradoxical, but they actually reflect a deep understanding of organizational decision-
making. In fact, those who are on top of a hierarchy may be called to make those very
important decisions by oversight that legitimate the organization in front of its stake-
holders. In order to do so, they do not need to be able to solve problems — a popular
dictum says that the managers are those who entertain guests while the others are work-
ing. As in the previous case, the possibility of assigning heterogeneous efficiency was
not contemplated by Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM.
All three distributions of ability, efficiency and difficulty did exist in the original
GCM, though they were not labelled with these names. However, Cohen, March and
Olsen did not explore the implications of the distribution by incompetence. On the
contrary, we discovered that a comparison between the distribution by competence and
the distribution by incompetence offers profound insights.
5The random distribution was labelled “1” in Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM.
6The distribution by competence was labelled “0” in Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM.
7The distribution by incompetence was labelled “2” in Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM.
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Figure 2: The flow chart of the GCM with two kinds of flight: flight by postponement
and flight by buck-passing. Resolutions and oversights mark the end of a decision
process, whereas flights make it start again.
4.2 Postponement and Buck-Passing
In Cohen, March and Olsen’s GCM, a flight from a difficult problem could only occur
by attaching the difficult problem to another opportunity, which amounts to postpone
the problem. However, the subsequent litterature on organizational decision-making
suggests that a second mechanism may serve the same aim. This second mechanism is
buck-passing [10]. A flight by buck-passing would mean that a participant attaches a
difficult problem to another participant, rather than to another opportunity.
Possibly, buck-passing was not explored in the original model because participants
moved in block from one opportunity to another, a circumstance that has been sharply
criticized because it is clearly at odds with the verbal theoretical statements of the
GCM [1]. On the contrary, buck-passing can be easily implemented in our agent-based
version, where no such distortion exists.
Figure (2) depicts a flowchart of postponing decision-making, buckpassing, making
decisions by resolution and making decisions by oversight. Its purpose is to make clear
that flights are not styles of decision-making, but rather tricks that may enable decision-
making at a subsequent step.
A flight by postponement takes place when a second opportunity comes across a
blocked decision process. One of the blocked problems is attached to one of the two
opportunities, and goes away with it. If the blocked problems have different difficulties,
then the most difficult among the blocked problems is selected. If opportunities are
ordered by a hierarchical structure, then the least important among the two available
opportunities is selected.
A flight by buck-passing takes place when a second participant comes across a
blocked decision process. One of the blocked decision problems is attached to one
of the two participants, and goes away with it. If blocked problems have different
difficulties, then the most difficult among the blocked problems is selected. If the two
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participants have different abilities, then the most difficult among the blocked problems
is attached to the least able participant.
We chose to have flights by buck-passing as the second alternative to flights by
postponement. That is, if both a second opportunity and a second participant become
available at a blocked decision process, then the most difficult among the problem
is attached to an opportunity and goes away with it (flight by postponement); if, after
doing so, the decision process is still blocked, then the most difficult among the blocked
problems is attached to the least able participant (flight by buck-passing). However, this
is quite an unlikely case.
In our agent-based version of the GCM we want to explore what happens if both
flights by postponement and by buck-passing are allowed, as well as what happens if
only one kind of flight is allowed. Note that if flights by buck-passing are allowed,
the very nature of blocked decision processes is modified. In fact, if flights by buck-
passing are not allowed it may occur that several participants are blocked on a decision
process. On the contrary, if flights by buck-passing are allowed this possibility cannot
occur for each participant receives a problem to go away with.
5 What to Look For
Cohen, March and Olsen concluded from their simulations that organizational decision-
making is characterized by eight properties, of which the following five were confirmed
by subsequent tests [4] [8] [9]: 8
1. Only a few decisions solve problems. Most decisions are made by oversight.
2. If opportunities are ordered by importance (i.e., if there is a hierarchy), then the
most important opportunities are least likely to solve problems.
3. Participants and problems chase one another across choice opportunities. Thus,
the participants have the impression of facing always the same problems.
4. In an organized anarchy some problems stay unsolved for a long time, indepen-
dently of the structures of decisions and accesses.
5. The efficiency (number of decisions by resolution) of an organization depends
on the difficulty of the problems that it is called to solve.
The first three properties point to very interesting features of organizational decision-
making. They may be rephrased and commented as follows:
1. Decisions by oversight are very common, much more common than decisions
made in order to solve problems. This result suggests that the rational mode
of decision-making is a very rare case. Most decisions are socially induced acts
made with the purpose of obtaining legitimacy by conforming to required rituals.
8The sequence and numbering of these properties is neither as in [4], nor as in [8] [9].
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2. If there is a hierarchy, then top executives are busy with gaining legitimacy for
their organization by means of decisions by oversight, whereas the bottom line
cares about solving problems.
3. Organizations make themselves busy with a few problems that present them-
selves again and again. So participants have the impression of facing always the
same problems.
On the contrary, properties (4) and (5) are much less interesting. In fact, property
(4) is implied by property (3), for if problems are met again and again, then they stay
unsolved for a long time. Property (5) is quite obvious, for difficult problems make
decisions by resolution rare.
Henceforth, properties (4) and (5) will be ignored. We shall focus on proper-
ties (1), (2) and (3) instead, which entail interesting insights for organizational decision-
making.
Cohen, March and Olsen supported their claims by means of twenty-one indicators
[4]. Most of them are redundant, and strongly correlated with one another. Henceforth,
we shall test each property by means of one single indicator especially designed to
highlight it.
Property (3) deserves a special discussion. Cohen, March and Olsen presented it as
an outcome of the model, but they actually embedded it explicitely in their algorithm.
This fact has been sharply criticized in the subsequent literature [1], and never settled in
spite of a reply by Olsen himself [13]. In our agent-based GCM, we are able to oberve
(3) as an emergent property arising naturally from the assumption of the model. 9
In the end, the three properties (1), (2) and (3) will be analyzed by means of the
following three indicators:
1. Property (1) will be proven by observing the fraction of decisions that are made
by oversight and by resolution;
2. Property (2) will be proven by comparing the ratio of decisions by oversight to
decisions by resolution at low and high hierarchical levels;
3. Property (3) will be proven by comparing: (i) the ratio of meetings between
participants and opportunities that they already met, to total meetings between
participants and opportunities; (ii) the ratio of meetings between participants
and solutions that they already met, to total meetings between participants and
solutions, and (iii) the ratio of meetings between participants and problems that
they already met, to total meetings between participants and problems.
The following magnitudes will be observed. Some of them will be used to compute
the above indicators. Others have been added in order to provide a better picture of the
decision process:
9In previous publications [8] [9], where we aimed at reproducing an agent-based GCM that would be
as close as possible to the original model, we were bound to use Cohen, March and Olsen’s twenty-one
indicators. Thus, although we did derive (3) as an emergent property, we had to prove it by means of an
approximate analytical procedure.
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• The number of decisions by resolution, the number of decisions by oversight, the
number of flights by postponement and the number of flights by buck-passing;
• The average number of blocked decision processes and their average size (num-
ber of agents involved), as well as number of agent not involved in blocked
decision processes per simulation step;
• The average number pairs opportunity-problem (stemming from flights by post-
ponement) and the average number of pairs participant-problem (stemming from
flights by buck-passing) during a simulation step;
• The average life of blocked decision processes, of pairs opportunity-problem and
of pairs participant-problems, measured in terms of simulation steps;
• If there is a hierarchy, the number of decisions by oversight and by resolution
taking place at opportunities ranked in the lower half and the upper half of im-
portance, respectively;
• The number of meetings between participants and opportunities, solutions and
problems and the number of meetings with opportunities, solutions and problems
that they have already met, summed over all 5,000 simulation steps.
6 The Simulations
We carried out simulations with 100 participants, 100 opportunities, 100 solutions and
100 problems. We imposed that opportunities, solutions and problems die once they
had been involved in decision-making, but not participants. This choice has been made
because it allows to check whether participants meet the same problems again and
again, as well as the same solutions and the same opportunities.
Whenever opportunities, solutions and problems died, they were immediately re-
placed with agents created with the same initial conditions. This makes sense, because
an organization continuously faces new problems that arise in its environment, con-
ceives new solutions and finds new opportunities for making a choice.
With these assumptions, the number of agents was constant over time. Each run
lasted 5,000 steps. Values were obtained by averaging the outcomes over 100 runs.
The following arrangements will be explored in the corresponding subsections. In
all arrangements ability and difficulty range in the [0,10] interval, whereas efficiency
ranges in the [0,1] interval.
• Anarchical decision structure, anarchical availability structure and anarchical ac-
cess structure, with random assignments of ability, efficiency and difficulty to
participants, solutions and problems, respectively. This arrangement is closest
to Cohen, March and Olsen’s “organized anarchy”, to which no structure is im-
posed. The only difference is that ability, efficiency and difficulty are assigned at
random rather than being homogeneous across participants, solutions and prob-
lems, respectively. Thus, we call this arrangement the “random anarchy”.
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• Hierarchical decision structure, hierarchical availability structure and hierarchi-
cal access structure. Common wisdom is that those who are high in the hierarchy
should be more competent than those who are low in the hierarchy, that the most
efficient solutions should be available to them and that they should deal with the
most difficult problems. In this arrangement, ability, efficiency and difficulty are
assigned according to this rationale. We call it the “competent hierarchy”.
• Hierarchical decision structure, hierarchical availability structure and hierarchi-
cal access structure, with ability, efficiency and difficulty assigned with the oppo-
site criterium as above. So the decision-makers who are on top of a hierarchy are
the least able to solve problems, they apply inefficient solutions and they make
themselves busy with the easiest among available problems. In this arrange-
ment, ability, efficiency and difficulty are assigned according a rationale that we
call the “incompetent hierarchy”. Awkward as it may appear at first sight, this
arrangement makes sense if one assumes that the main role of top managers is
that of making decisions by oversight that legitimate their organization. Since no
ability to solve problems is required in order to make decisions by oversight, the
incompetent hierarchy is no absurdity.
In each arrangement, simulations are carried out (a) by allowing flights only by
postponement, (b) by allowing flights both by postponement and buck-passing, (c) by
allowing flights only by buck-passing, and (d) by allowing no flights. In this way, we
investigate to what extent the properties (1), (2) and (3) of § (5) are affected by the kind
of flight taking place.
6.1 The Random Anarchy
In the random anarchy, if both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are
allowed, then flights by postponement outnumber flights by buck-passing (1,036.11
vs. 767.03). Experimentations clarified that the main reason is not our precedence
assumption — i.e., the assumption that first a flight by postponement is attempted and
only subsequently, if this was not possible, the conditions for a flight by buck-passing
are examined. In order to understand why flights by postponement outnumber flights
by buck-passing it is important to remark that flights do not necessarily occur some
time after a decision process has been blocked. Flights may also occur at the very
moment a decision process gets blocked, if more than one opportunity or more than
one participant are involved in it.
Keeping this in mind, the fact that flights by postponement outnumber flights by
buck-passing follows directly from eq. (1). In fact, a decision process is blocked if this
inequality is not satisfied, and this is most likely to happen if only a limited number of
participants are involved. In particular, quite often only one participant is involved in
a blocked decision process: in all these cases, a flight by buck-passing cannot occur at
the very moment the decision process is blocked. On the contrary, eq. (1) introduces no
bias on the number of opportunities that may be involved in a blocked decision process.
Thus, quite often a decision process may be blocked when two or more opportunities
are present. In all such cases, a flight by postponement follows immediately.
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Note also that if only flights by postponement are allowed, their number is slightly
smaller than in the case where both kinds of flights are allowed (964.71 vs. 1,036.11).
However, the average number of pairs opportunity-problem (generated by flights by
postponement) in a simulation step when only flights by postponement are allowed is
roughly the same as in the case both kinds of flights are allowed (19.06 vs. 19.31).
This can be reconciled with the previous finding because their mean life is longer if
only flights by postponement are allowed (131.84 vs. 120.84 simulation steps).
A remarkable finding is that if only flights by buck-passing are allowed their num-
ber increases appreciably with respect to the case when both kinds of flight are allowed
(1,642.93 vs. 767.03). The average number of pairs participant-problem (generated by
flights by buck-passing) increases as well (32.13 vs. 14.63). However, the mean life of
these pairs increases only slightly (139.45 vs. 120.39 simulation steps).
The reason is that pairs participant-problem resulting from a flight by buck-passing,
having been formed with the least able available participant and the most difficult avail-
able problem, are more likely to originate a blocked decision process than the pairs
opportunity-problem resulting from a flight by postponement, that have been formed
with the most difficult available problem but that must find a participant by means of
random encounters. So flights by buck-passing generate more blocked decision pro-
cesses (5.52 if only flights by buck-passing are allowed vs. 2.86 if both flights by post-
ponement and by buck-passing are allowed), which in their turn generate more flights
by buck-passing, and so forth. The consequence is that there are many more pairs
participant-problem than pairs opportunity-problem, but that they do not live much
longer.
If both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed, the sim-
ulations yield an average of 420.28 decisions by resolution and 1,950.94 decisions by
oversight during 5,000 steps. If only flights by postponement are allowed, the corre-
sponding figures are 388.80 and 1,863.45, respectively. If only flights by buck-passing
are allowed, these figures decrease further to 358.32 and 1,352.84, respectively. Fi-
nally, if no flights are allowed the number of decisions is lowest, with 43.90 decisions
by resolution and 779.57 decisions by oversight. Thus, flights clearly help decision-
making. The obvious reason is that flights help cracking blocked decision processes so
the previously blocked agents become available.
This is not evident from the number of blocked decision processes per simulation
step, which is even greater when flights are allowed with respect to the case when
flights are not allowed (5.52 if only flights by buck-passing are allowed, 2.86 if both
flights by postponement and by buck-passing are allowed, 2.83 if only flights by post-
ponement are allowed vs. 2.16 if flights are not allowed). However, blocked decision
processes persist much longer if flights are not allowed (9.58 steps if both kinds of
flight are allowed, 16.37 steps if only flights by postponement are allowed, 21.49 steps
if only flights by buck-passing are allowed vs. 1,268.63 steps if flights are not allowed).
Flights do not decrease the number of blocked decision processes, but shorten their life.
It is clear that most decisions are made by oversight, as expressed by property (1) of
§ (5). This stems from the fact that it is much more likely that a participant, an oppor-
tunity and a solution meet on the same square, than that a participant, an opportunity
and a problem meet on the same square and, furthermore, the inequality (1) is satisfied.
Figure (3) shows that decisions by oversight (white bars) are far more common than
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Figure 3: The fraction of decisions by oversight (white bars) and decisions by resolu-
tion (black bars) in the random anarchy. Left to right, only flights by postponement (P):
oversights 82.74%, resolutions 17.26%; flights both by postponement and by buck-
passing (P, B): oversights 82.28%, resolutions 17.72%; only flights by buck-passing
(B): oversights 79.06%, resolutions 20.94%; no flights at all (–): oversights 94.67%,
resolutions 5.33%.
decisions by resolution (black bars).
However, figure (3) also highlights that in the random anarchy the proportion of
decisions by resolution is highest when flights take place, either by postponement, or
by buck-passing, or both (compare the rightmost bar with the other three). In fact,
by taking away the most difficult problems one at a time, flights are likely to lead to
a decision by resolution unless the least difficult problem is still too difficult for the
blocked participants. This can be proven by observing that among decisions made
when blocked decision processes are unlocked by flights, the proportion of decisions
by resolution is much higher than the average (57.55% if (P), 39.50% if (P, B), 60.63%
if (B)).
If making a substantial portion of decisions by resolution is considered a positive
feature of an organization [4], then the above remark is quite interesting. In fact, it
implies that activities that are generally condemned at the individual level — such as
postponing decision-making and passing the buck instead of taking responsibility —
may actually have a positive impact on the organization as a whole.
Among the configurations favoring decisions by resolution, the one where only
flights by buck-passing are allowed comes first (20.94% of decisions by resolution,
third bar from the left), followed by the configuration where both kinds of flight are
allowed (17.72% of decisions by resolution, second bar from the left) or only flights
by postponement are allowed (17.26% of decisions by resolution, first bar from the
left). This happens because flights by buck-passing are very many if this is the only
kind of flight allowed (1,642.93 at (B), 767.03 at (P, B)). Furthermore, flights by buck-
passing generate more blocked decision processes (5.52 if (B), 2.86 if (P, B), 2.83 if
(P)). Consequently, more decisions by resolution occur when these blocked decision
processes are unlocked.
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Figure 4: In the random anarchy: (i) the ratio of meetings with solutions that have
already been met to total meetings with solutions (downward stripes); (ii) the ratio of
meetings with solutions that have already been met to total meetings with solutions (up-
ward stripes), and (iii) the ratio of meetings with problems that have already been met
to total meetings with problems (black). Left to right, these three ratios are depicted
when only flights by postponement are allowed (P): 54.59%, 57.06% and 62.52%, re-
spectively; when both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed
(P, B): 53.12%, 55.87% and 62.89%, respectively; when only flights by buck-passing
are allowed (B): 53.27%, 53.58% and 59.76%, respectively; when no flights at all are
allowed (–): 51.79%, 51.59% and 56.89%, respectively.
Property (2) cannot be observed in a random hierarchy, for it refers to hierarchi-
cal levels. Let us consider property (3), i.e., that participants have the impression of
meeting the same problems again and again.
Figure (4) illustrates three ratios: (i) the ratio of meetings with opportunities that
have already been met to total meetings with opportunities (downward stripes); (ii) the
ratio of meetings with solutions that have already been met to total meetings with so-
lutions (upward stripes), and (iii) the ratio of meetings with problems that have already
been met to total meetings with problems (black). These three ratios are repeated,
left to right, in the case only flights by postponement are allowed (P), in the case both
flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed (P, B), in the case only
flights by buck-passing are allowed (B), and in the case no flights are allowed at all (–).
According to figure (4), about 60% of the times participants meet problems that
they have already met. Thus, Cohen, March and Olsen’s claim is confirmed. Notably,
this is an emergent property of the GCM, as Cohen, March and Olsen claimed it should
be, but did not do in their 1972 simulations [4].
However, we discovered that more than 50% of the times participants meet oppor-
tunities and solutions, they meet opportunities and solutions that they had already met.
Thus, meeting the same agents again and again is quite a general property of the GCM,
although this property is strongest when it regards problems.
The reason is that this property obtains because opportunities, solutions and prob-
lems have been assumed to die and to be replaced once they have been involved in
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decision-making, which occurs quite often. However, problems die less often than op-
portunities and solutions because they are only involved in decisions by resolution, that
are rare. Thus, it is easier to meet a problem that has already been met than meeting an
opportunity or a solution that has already been met.
A striking feature of figure (4) is that the four groups of bars (P), (P, B), (B), (–)
are nearly indistinguishable from one another, meaning that the property concerning
meeting agents that have already been met is essentially independent of flights. This
is due to the fact that, by unlocking blocked decision processes, flights increase both
the number of meetings with agents that have already been met (because the number of
decisions increases from 823.47 if (–) to 1,711.16 if (B), to 2,252.25 if (P) and 2,371.22
if (B, P)) and the overall number of meetings (because the average size of a blocked
decision process decreases from 101.21 if (–) to 14.81 if (B), to 7.56 if (P, B) and 5.82
if (P)). Being these the two terms of a ratio, their increases cancel one another.
However, a feature of figure (4) that clearly depends on flights is that flights by post-
ponement enhance the difference between meeting the same opportunities and meeting
the same solutions again and again (compare the two pairs of striped bars on the left
to the two pairs of striped bars on the right of figure (4)). The data show that this is
not due to the denominator of the ratios illustrated in figure (4) (meetings with op-
portunities and solutions, respectively: (P) 37,759.97 vs. 38,764.00; (P, B) 33,243.95
vs. 33,267.41; (B) 23,258.25 vs. 23,451.05; (–) 21,551.69 vs. 21,505.82), but to the
numerator (meetings with opportunities and solutions that have already been met, re-
spectively: (P) 20,616.57 vs. 22,119.94; (P, B) 17,660.41 vs. 18,591.20; (B) 12,402.68
vs. 12,578.51; (–) 11,330.99 vs. 11.268.55).
The explanation starts with the observation that many flights occur at the very step
a decision process gets blocked. If flights by postponement are allowed, at the very
moment a decision process gets blocked they take away opportunities that may be used
by other participants for decision-making. So we find that if flights by postponement
are allowed, the number of non-blocked opportunities is greater than the number of
non-blocked solutions ((P): 97.03 non-blocked opportunities vs. 92.80 non-blocked
solutions; (P, B): 96.90 non-blocked opportunities vs. 93.62 non-blocked solutions),
whereas if flights by postponement are not allowed, the number of non-blocked op-
portunities is roughly the same as the number of non-blocked solutions ((B): 72.49
non-blocked opportunities vs. 73.14 non-blocked solutions; (–): 53.44 non-blocked
opportunities vs. 53.06 non-blocked solutions). Decisions cause both opportunities
and solutions to be replaced, decreasing the probability of meeting again the same op-
portunity or the same solution. However, if the set of non-blocked solutions is smaller
than the set of non-blocked opportunities, it is more likely that a solution is used and
replaced before it is met again than an opportunity is used and replaced before it is met
again. Hence the observed pattern.
Another differentiation can be observed in figure (4) regarding the height of the
black bars, where the fourth one is lowest ((P): 62.52%; (P, B): 62.89%; (B): 59.76%;
(–): 56.89%). Not all participants measure what opportunities, solutions and problems
are met again and again, but only those participants who are neither involved in a
blocked decision process, nor are carrying a problem as a result of a flight by buck-
passing.
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6.2 The Competent Hierarchy
With respect to the relative frequency of flights by postponement and by buck-passing,
the behavior of the competent hierarchy is opposite to that of the random anarchy. In
fact, if both are allowed, then flights by buck-passing outnumber flights by postpone-
ment (372.22 vs. 131.91).
It is necessary to remark that, in order for a flight to take place, a pair opportunity-
problem or participant-problem must be able to leave the place where a decision prob-
lem is blocked. In a hierarchy, for a pair opportunity-problem this means finding a
neighboring position where there is no lower-ranking participant, no lower-ranking so-
lution and no lower-ranking problem. For a pair participant-problem this means finding
a neighboring position where there is no higher-ranking opportunity. The first require-
ment is much stricter than the second one. Thus, if agents are arranged in hierarchies
flights by buck-passing are much easier than flights by postponement.
As in the random anarchy, if only flights by postponement are allowed their number
decreases with respect to the case where both are allowed (77.47 vs. 131.91). Contrary
to the random anarchy, both a lower number of pairs opportunity-problem (2.59 vs.
3.60) and their longer life (285.61 vs. 208.90 steps) concur to this effect.
If only flights by buck-passing are allowed, their number increases with respect to
the case where both are allowed, though less impressively as in the random anarchy
(471.46 vs. 372.22). The average number of pairs participant-problem increases as
well (23.35 vs. 18.89), and so does their mean life (393.59 vs. 381.65). The number
of blocked decision processes is greater in (B) than in any other configuration, though
the difference is not as large as in the random anarchy (2.28 if (B) vs. 1.66 if (P),
1.57 if (P, B) and 1.48 if (–)). The explanation is the same as in the random anarchy,
namely, that flights by buck-passing generate pairs made by a low-ability participant
and a high-difficulty problem, which are most likely to block other decision processes
and generate other flights by buck-passing.
If both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed, the sim-
ulations yield an average of 130.59 decisions by resolution and 757.80 decisions by
oversight during 5,000 steps. If only flights by buck-passing are allowed, the corre-
sponding figures are 123.42 and 626.31, respectively. If only flights by postponement
are allowed, these figures decrease further to 60.17 and 610.23, respectively. Finally,
if no flights are allowed the number of decisions is lowest, with 24.82 decisions by
resolution and 461.94 decisions by oversight. So in the competent hierarchy as in the
random anarchy, flights favor decision-making by liberating blocked agents.
Similarly to the random anarchy, this mechanism does not work through the num-
ber of blocked decision processes per simulation step, which is not appreciably differ-
ent with and without flights ((P): 1.57; (P, B): 1.66; (B): 2.28; (–): 1.48), but rather
through the time blocked decision processes remain in their condition ((P): 17.10; (P,
B): 288.02; (B): 35.32; (–): 1035.76). This time is much longer if flights are not al-
lowed.
Also in the competent hierarchy most decisions are made by oversight, as expressed
by property (1) of § (5). As in the random anarchy, this is due to the fact that it is much
more likely that a participant, an opportunity and a solution meet on the same square,
than that a participant, an opportunity and a problem meet on the same square and,
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Figure 5: The ratio of decisions by oversight (white bars) to decisions by resolution
(black bars) in the competent hierarchy. Left to right, flights only by postponement
(P): oversights 91.02%, resolutions 8.97%; flights both by postponement and by buck-
passing (P, B): oversights 85.30%, resolutions 14.70%; flights only by buck-passing
(B): oversights 83.54%, resolutions 16.46%; no flights at all (–): oversights 94.90%,
resolutions 5.10%.
furthermore, the inequality (1) is satisfied. Figure (5) shows that decisions by oversight
(white bars) are far more common than decisions by resolution (black bars).
Figure (5) highlights that, similarly to the random anarchy, flights enhance the pro-
portion of decisions by resolution (compare the rightmost bar to the other three). As
in the case of the random anarchy, this is due to the fact that by taking away the most
difficult problems one at a time, flights are likely to lead to a decision by resolution
unless the least difficult problem is still too difficult for the blocked participants. Also
in the competent hierarchy this can be proven by showing that where a decision process
used to be blocked, flights obtain much higher proportions of decisions by resolution
((P): resolutions 77.82%; (P, B): resolutions 55.54%; (B): resolutions 71.09%).
However, a notable difference is that in the competent hierarchy flights by buck-
passing, either alone or in conjunction with flights by postponement, are much more
effective than flights by postponement in increasing the proportion of decisions by
resolution (compare the two bars in the middle to the first one from the left). The
reason is that — as explained at the beginning of this section — in the competent
hierarchy flights by buck-passing always outnumber flights by postponement.
As in the case of the random anarchy, these results are strongly counterintuitive.
In particular, it does not seem to square with common wisdom that in the competent
hierarchy passing the most difficult problems to the least competent participants —
those at the bottom levels — has beneficial consequences for the organization as a
whole.
The fact is that, in a competent hierarchy, buck-passing helps the participants on
top of the hierarchy to make decisions. Essentially, the rationale is that by sacrificing
its least able members with “impossible missions”, an organization may perform better.
Let us consider property (2), i.e., that the top managers of a hierarchy are mostly
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Figure 6: The competent hierarchy. The ratio of the number of decisions by oversight
to the number of decisions by resolution, measured on the lower half of the hierarchy
(grey) and the upper half of the hierarchy (black). Left to right, these ratios are shown
in the case only flights by postponement are allowed (P): 8.89, 51.36; when both flights
by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed (P, B): 5.06, 29.73; when only
flights by buck-passing are allowed (B): 4.57, 13.38; and when no flights are allowed
at all (–): 16.93, 44.55.
concerned with decisions by oversight, whereas the few decisions by resolution that are
made in the organization are mostly made at the bottom levels. Figure (6) illustrates
the ratio of decisions by oversight to decisions by resolution at low hierarchical levels
(grey bars) and high hierarchical levels (black bars), for all combinations of kinds of
flights.
It is evident that this property is confirmed, for black bars are always higher than
grey bars. It descends from the very fact that a participant, an opportunity and a solution
suffice to make a decision by oversight whereas a participant, an opportunity, a solution
and a problem are required for a decision by resolution. Thus, the probability of making
a decision by oversight at a particular square is the product of three probabilities, one
for each of the three agents required to be there, whereas the probability of making a
decision by resolution is the product of four probabilities. Hierarchical structures make
movements more difficult, so the probability of an agent to be on a specific square is
smaller. By multiplying four smaller numbers the outcome decreases to a larger extent
than by multiplying three smaller numbers. Thus, hierarchies decrease the probability
of a decision by resolution to a greater extent than they decrease the probability of a
decision by oversight.
According to our interpretation, decisions by oversight represent rituals that are
made in order to fullfill social requirements [12] [7]. They do not originate from real
problems, and they require none. Thus, it should not be not a surprise that this kind of
actions is a main task of top hierarchical levels. Put it differently, the GCM suggests
that there is some truth in the dictum that “Managers are those who entertain guests
while the others are working”, but also that the meaning of the dictum — denigrating
top executives — is wrong.
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Figure 7: In the competent hierarchy: (i) the ratio of meetings with solutions that have
already been met to total meetings with solutions (downward stripes); (ii) the ratio of
meetings with solutions that have already been met to total meetings with solutions (up-
ward stripes), and (iii) the ratio of meetings with problems that have already been met
to total meetings with problems (black). Left to right, these three ratios are depicted
when only flights by postponement are allowed (P): 56.58%, 60.79% and 64.80%, re-
spectively; when both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed
(P, B): 55.19%, 59.82% and 68.62%, respectively; when only flights by buck-passing
are allowed (B): 55.72%, 59.71% and 67.67%, respectively; when no flights at all are
allowed (–): 56.44%, 60.85% and 67.69%, respectively.
The first three pairs of bars of figure (6) decrease left to right; the fourth pair in-
creases. This is coherent with figure (5), where the same pattern is evident for white
bars. It happens simply because the bars of figure (6) represent ratios of oversights
to resolutions while the white bars of figure (5) represent percentages of oversights to
total decisions.
Let us consider property (3), i.e., that participants meet the same problems again
and again. Figure (7) illustrates three ratios: (i) the ratio of meetings with opportunities
that have already been met to total meetings with opportunities (downward stripes); (ii)
the ratio of meetings with solutions that have already been met to total meetings with
solutions (upward stripes), and (iii) the ratio of meetings with problems that have al-
ready been met to total meetings with problems (black). These three ratios are repeated,
left to right, in the case only flights by postponement are allowed (P), in the case both
flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed (P, B), in the case only
flights by buck-passing are allowed (B), and in the case no flights are allowed at all (–).
According to figure (7), about 65% of the times participants meet problems, they
meet problems that they had already met. Thus, Cohen, March and Olsen’s claim is
confirmed to an even greater extent than in the random anarchy. Also the percentages
of meetings with opportunities and solutions that have already been met are quite high
(about 55% and 60%, respectively), confirming that this is quite a general property of
the GCM. As in the random anarchy, the reason for meeting the same problems more
often than the same opportunities and solutions is that problems are only involved in
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decisions by resolution, whereas opportunities and solutions are involved in all deci-
sions.
Figure (7) shows that in the competent hierarchy it is always more likely to meet
solutions that have already been met than meeting opportunities that have already been
met, independently of flights. In the random anarchy this difference was smaller, and
it occurred only when flights by postponement were allowed to take place.
The impact of flights by postponement on the number of non-blocked opportuni-
ties is negligible in the competent hierarchy, because flights by postponement are much
fewer than in the random anarchy (77.47 vs. 964.71 if (P); 131.91 vs. 1036.11 if (B,
P)). The data show that, contrary to the random anarchy, both the number of meetings
and the number of meetings with items that have already been met differ considerably
between opportunities and solutions. In particular, while the number of meetings with
solutions is close to the values attained in the random anarchy, the number of meet-
ings with opportunities is much lower in all configurations of flights (meetings with
opportunities and solutions, respectively: (P) 17,030.37 vs. 35,415.8; (P, B) 17,963.29
vs. 33,773.31; (B) 15,703.40 vs. 30,102.66; (–) 13,809.98 vs. 29,594.78). So in the
competent hierarchy another mechanism must be at work.
In a hierarchical structure such as has been defined in § (4.1), participants can meet
any solution, but they are only allowed to meet opportunities that are lower than their
own hierarchical level. The participants of high hierarchical level can meet all oppor-
tunities, measuring a ratio of meetings with opportunities that have already been met
that is akin to the one measured in the random anarchy. On the contrary, the partici-
pants of low hierarchical level are only allowed to meet a correspondingly small subset
of low-importance opportunities. These opportunities are involved in decision-making
much more often than the high-importance opportunities (decisions at low hierarchical
levels vs. decisions at high hierarchical levels: (P) 577.73 vs. 92.67; (P, B) 766.99
vs. 121.40; (B) 648.51 vs. 101.22; (–) 417.98 vs. 68.78). Thus, it is quite likely that
these opportunities are used and replaced before many participants can meet the several
times. Hence the observed pattern.
All percentages of meetings with agents that have already been met are higher in
the competent hierarchy than in the random anarchy. The reason is that in the com-
petent hierarchy fewer decisions are made ((P): 670.40 vs. 2,252.25; (P, B): 888.39
vs. 2,371.22; (B): 749.73 vs. 1,711.16; (–): 486.76 vs. 823.47), so fewer agents are
replaced.
As in the random anarchy, the property of meeting the same agents again and again
is roughly independent of flights. The reason is the same: by unlocking blocked de-
cision processes, flights increase both the number of meetings with agents that have
already been met (because the number of decisions increases from 486.76 if (–) to
670.40 if (P), to 749.73 if (B) and 888.39 if (P, B)) and the overall number of meetings
(because the average size of a blocked decision process decreases from 61.29 if (–) to
35.79 if (P), to 12.81 if (B) and 6.88 if (B, P)). Being these the two terms of a ratio,
their increases cancel one another.
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6.3 The Incompetent Hierarchy
The incompetent hierarchy, by design, runs contrary to common wisdom. And yet,
the GCM suggests that this organizational arrangement is not absurd. In fact, “com-
petence” refers to the ability to solve problems, but this may not be the kind of abil-
ity required from top executives. Executives, and particularly top executives, may be
mostly concerned with establishing and maintaining social relations within their own
organization as well as between their organization and the outer world. These activities
aim at obtaining social legitimacy for the organization; they are not concerned with
solving problems, but rather with preventing them [12] [7].
In the GCM, these social activities reflect into the decisions by oversight. Since
decisions by oversight involve no problem, they do not require the ability to solve them.
Thus, having managers that are not good at solving problems may not be as absurd as
it seems at first sight. Possibly, managers should be good at social networking rather
than at problem solving.
Cohen, March and Olsen did not investigate the incompetent hierarchy, though they
did define this arrangement. On the contrary, we focus our attention on its properties
and their implications.
In the incompetent hierarchy, as in the competent hierarchy, if both flights by post-
ponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed, then flights by buck-passing out-
number flights by postponement (632.97 vs. 283.18). The reason is the same as in the
competent hierarchy. In any hierarchy, leaving the place where a decision is blocked
means for a pair opportunity-problem finding a neighboring position where there is no
lower-ranking participant, no lower-ranking solution and no lower-ranking problem.
For a pair participant-problem, it means finding a neighboring position where there is
no higher-ranking opportunity. The first requirement is stricter than the second one.
However, in the incompetent hierarchy the most difficult problems are dealt by the
participants at the lowest hierarchical levels. Thus, most of blocked decision processes
find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy. From there, it is easier to move away if
the conditions for a flight arise. Thus, flights are less than in the random anarchy, but
more than in the competent hierarchy.
Similarly to the random anarchy and the competent hierarchy, if only flights by
postponement are allowed their number decreases with respect to the case where both
kinds of flights are allowed (124.16 vs. 283.18). As in the competent hierarchy, both a
lower number of pairs opportunity-problem (4.45 vs. 7.25) and their longer life (335.43
vs. 209.32) concur to this effect.
If only flights by buck-passing are allowed, their number increases with respect to
the case where both are allowed (668.35 vs. 632.97). The average number of pairs
participant-problem increases as well (30.69 vs. 22.24), and so does their mean life
(371.09 vs. 256.48). The number of blocked decision processes is greater in (B) than
in any other configuration (3.53 if (B), 2.65 if (P, B), 2.45 if (–), 2.24 if (P)). The
explanation is the same as in the random anarchy and the competent hierarchy, namely,
that flights by buck-passing generate pairs made by a low-ability participant and a
high-difficulty problem, which are most likely to block other decision processes and
generate other flights by buck-passing.
If both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed, the sim-
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Figure 8: The ratio of decisions by oversight (white bars) to decisions by resolution
(black bars) in the incompetent hierarchy. Left to right, flights only by postponement
(P): oversights 88.86%, resolutions 11.13%; flights both by postponement and by buck-
passing (P, B): oversights 79.73%, resolutions 20.27%; flights only by buck-passing
(B): oversights 85.11%, resolutions 14.89%; no flights at all (–): oversights 96.15%,
resolutions 3.85%.
ulations yield an average of 153.02 decisions by resolution and 601.82 decisions by
oversight during 5,000 steps. If only flights by postponement are allowed, the corre-
sponding figures are 63.68 and 508.19, respectively. If only flights by buck-passing are
allowed, these figures decrease further to 52.8 and 301.84, respectively. Finally, if no
flights are allowed the number of decisions is lowest, with 7.71 decisions by resolution
and 192.77 decisions by oversight. It is clear that in the incompetent hierarchy, just
like in the competent hierarchy and the random anarchy, flights favor decision-making
by liberating blocked agents.
Similarly to the random anarchy, this mechanism does not work through the number
of blocked decision processes per simulation step, which is not appreciably different
with and without flights ((P): 2.24; (P, B): 2.65; (B): 3.53; (–): 2.45), but rather through
the time blocked decision processes remain in their condition ((P): 274.52; (P, B):
40.66; (B): 35.32; (–): 1920.01). This time differs across flight configurations, but it is
clear that it is much longer if flights are not allowed.
A more important remark is that in the incompetent hierarchy, as in the competent
hierarchy and the random anarchy, most decisions are made by oversight as expressed
by property (1) of § (5). As in the competent hierarchy and the random anarchy, this
depends on the fact that a meeting of a participant, an opportunity and a solution is more
likely than a meeting of a participant, an opportunity and a problem and, furthermore,
satisfy inequality (1). Figure (8) shows that decisions by oversight (white bars) are far
more common than decisions by resolution (black bars).
Similarly to the random anarchy and the competent hierarchy, flights increase the
proportion of decisions by resolution (compare the rightmost bar to the other three). As
in the case of the random anarchy and the competent hierarchy, this is due to the fact
that by taking away the most difficult problems one at a time, flights are likely to lead
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to a decision by resolution unless the least difficult problem is still too difficult for the
blocked participants. In fact, where a blocked decision process is unlocked by a flight
one observes proportions of decisions by resolution that are much higher than average
((P): resolutions 74.59%; (P, B): resolutions 51.75%; (B): resolutions 71.09%).
In the incompetent hierarchy, similarly to the competent hierarchy but contrary to
the random anarchy, flights by buck-passing, either alone or in conjunction with flights
by postponement, are more effective than flights by postponement in increasing the
proportion of decisions by resolution (compare the two bars in the middle to the first
one from the left). The reason is that in the incompetent hierarchy, as in the competent
hierarchy, flights by buck-passing outnumber flights by postponement.
Following Cohen, March and Olsen [4], we take the proportion of decisions by
resolution as an indicator of the efficiency of an organization. Our discussion of the
meaning of the incompetent hierarchy may suggest that this choice is inconsistent with
the idea that decisions by oversight, by obtaining legitimacy for the organization, are at
least as useful as decisions by resolution. Indeed, if decisions by oversight are useful,
then an organization does not maximize efficiency by not making any decisions by
oversight at all.
However, decisions by oversight make only an indirect contribution to an organi-
zation’s well-being. In § (2) we introduced decisions by oversight with the example of
a firm that complies with the procedures required by a rating agency. It is evident that
this is an important and positive activity for a firm, but also that decisions by oversight
should be ancillary to the more basic decisions by resolution. Thus, it makes sense to
take the proportion of decisions by resolution as an indicator of efficiency.
Let us now compare the efficiency of the random anarchy, the competent hierarchy
and the incompetent hierarchy (figures (3), (5) and (8)). If we consider the average
percentage of decisions by resolution in the four configurations (P), (P, B), (B) and
(–), it turns out that the random anarchy is the most efficient arrangement (15.31%),
followed by the incompetent hierarchy (12.53%) and finally by the competent hierar-
chy (11.31%). If we rank the peaks of efficiency, we find first the random anarchy
when only buck-passing is allowed (20.94%), closely followed by the incompetent hi-
erarchy when both postponement and buck-passing are allowed (20.27%), then again
the random anarchy when both kinds of flight are allowed (17.72%) and when only
postponement is allowed (17.26%), and only fifth the competent hierarchy when only
buck-passing is allowed (16.46%). On the whole it appears that hierarchies are gener-
ally not efficient in fostering decisions by resolution, although incompetent hierarchies
can perform fairly well if both postponement and buck-passing occur.
Let us consider property (2) of § (5), i.e., that the top managers of a hierarchy are
mostly concerned with decisions by oversight, whereas the few decisions by resolution
that are made in the organization are mostly made at the bottom levels. Figure (9) illus-
trates the ratio of decisions by oversight to decisions by resolution at low hierarchical
levels (grey bars) and high hierarchical levels (black bars).
It is evident that this property is confirmed also in the incompetent hierarchy, for
black bars are always higher than grey bars. In fact, since three agents suffice to make a
decision by oversight whereas four agents are required for a decision by resolution, the
probability of a decision by oversight at a particular square is the product of three prob-
abilities, one for each of the three agents required to be there, whereas the probability
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Figure 9: The incompetent hierarchy. The ratio of the number of decisions by oversight
to the number of decisions by resolution, measured on the lower half of the hierarchy
(grey) and the upper half of the hierarchy (black). Left to right, these ratios are shown in
the case only flights by postponement (P) are allowed: 6.91, 63.05; when both flights
by postponement and flights by buck-passing (P, B) are allowed: 3.55, 17.20; when
only flights by buck-passing (B) are allowed: 5.20, 28.51; and when no flights are
allowed at all (–): 22.20, 120.36
of a decision by resolution is the product of four probabilities. Hierarchical structures
make movements more difficult, so the probability of an agent to be on a specific square
is smaller. By multiplying four smaller numbers the decrease of the outcome is larger
than by multiplying three smaller numbers. Thus, hierarchies decrease the probability
of a decision by resolution to a greater extent than they decrease the probability of a
decision by oversight.
The pairs of bars of figure (9), decrease and increase following the same pattern as
the white bars of figure (8). This happens simply because both the bars of figure (9)
and the white bars of figure (8) are proportional to decisions by resolution. Note that
in the case of the competent hierarchy the minimum is reached at (B) — see figure (6)
— whereas in the case of the incompetent hierarchy the minimum is reached at (P, B)
— see figure (9).
Let us consider property (3), i.e., that participants meet the same problems again
and again. Figure (10) illustrates three ratios: (i) the ratio of meetings with opportuni-
ties that have already been met to total meetings with opportunities (downward stripes);
(ii) the ratio of meetings with solutions that have already been met to total meetings
with solutions (upward stripes), and (iii) the ratio of meetings with problems that have
already been met to total meetings with problems (black). These three ratios are re-
peated, left to right, in the case only flights by postponement are allowed (P), in the
case both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed (P, B), in
the case only flights by buck-passing are allowed (B), and in the case no flights are
allowed at all (–).
According to figure (10), about 60%–70% of the times participants meet problems,
they meet problems that they had already met. Thus, Cohen, March and Olsen’s claim
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Figure 10: In the incompetent hierarchy: (i) the ratio of meetings with solutions that
have already been met to total meetings with solutions (downward stripes); (ii) the ratio
of meetings with solutions that have already been met to total meetings with solutions
(upward stripes), and (iii) the ratio of meetings with problems that have already been
met to total meetings with problems (black). Left to right, these three ratios are depicted
when only flights by postponement are allowed (P): 56.46%, 60.28% and 62.48%, re-
spectively; when both flights by postponement and flights by buck-passing are allowed
(P, B): 52.68%, 59.41% and 67.53%, respectively; when only flights by buck-passing
are allowed (B): 52.04%, 63.06% and 70.34%, respectively; when no flights at all are
allowed (–): 53.15%, 61.41% and 65.00%, respectively.
is confirmed to an extent that is often greater than in the competent hierarchy, and much
greater than in the random anarchy. Also the percentages of meetings with opportuni-
ties and solutions that have already been met are quite high (about 50%–55% and about
60%, respectively), confirming once again that this is quite a general property of the
GCM. As in the competent hierarchy and the random anarchy, the reason for meeting
the same problems more often than the same opportunities and the same solutions is
that problems are only involved in decisions by resolution, whereas opportunities and
solutions are involved in all decisions.
Figure (10) shows that in the incompetent hierarchy, just like in the competent hi-
erarchy, it is always more likely to meet solutions that have already been met than
meeting opportunities that have already been met, independently of flights. The expla-
nation is essentially the same.
In a hierarchical structure such as has been defined in § (4.1), participants can meet
any solution, but they are only allowed to meet opportunities that are lower than their
own hierarchical level. The participants of high hierarchical level can meet all oppor-
tunities, measuring a ratio of meetings with opportunities that have already been met
that is akin to the one measured in the random anarchy. On the contrary, the partici-
pants of low hierarchical level are only allowed to meet a correspondingly small subset
of low-importance opportunities. These opportunities are involved in decision-making
much more often than the high-importance opportunities (decisions at low hierarchical
levels vs. decisions at high hierarchical levels: (P) 494.37 vs. 77.50; (P, B) 676.93 vs.
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77.91; (B) 320.41 vs. 34.23; (–) 173.78 vs. 26.70). Thus, it is quite likely that these op-
portunities are used and replaced before many participants can meet the several times.
Hence the observed pattern.
The average level of the percentages of meetings with agents that have already
been met in the incompetent hierarchy (0.60) is roughly the same as in the competent
hierarchy (0.61), and both are higher than in the random anarchy (0.56). The reason is
that the incompetent hierarchy make approximately the same number of decisions as
the competent hierarchy, whereas in the random anarchy more decisions are made so
more agents are replaced. Consequently, it is less likely to meet them again.
As in the random anarchy and the competent hierarchy the property of meeting the
same agents again and again is roughly independent of flights, though possibly less
so than in the previous cases. Also in the incompetent hierarchy flights increase both
the number of meetings with agents that have already been met (because the number
of decisions increases from 192.77 if (–) to 354.64 if (B), to 571.87 if (P) and 754.84
if (P, B)) and the overall number of meetings (because the average size of a blocked
decision process decreases from 71.88 if (–) to 36.31 if (P), to 22.91 if (B) and 7.29 if
(B, P)), so their increases cancel one another. However, this cancellation is less perfect
in the incompetent hierarchy so we observe that flights by buck-passing, either alone
or in conjunction with flights by postponement, increase the ratio of problems that had
already been met to total problems that have been met.
7 Conclusions
Although the GCM is widely cited, citations often come along with misrepresentations.
The GCM is often presented as a kind of “theater-of-the-absurd” interpretation of or-
ganizational decision-making. According to our reconstruction, such representations
of the GCM fail to identify its most consequential and innovative aspects.
In order to restore the original meaning and richness of the GCM, we made an effort
to present and extend the GCM by making reference to more recent streams of research
in organizational decision-making. We stressed that the seemingly absurd “decisions
by oversight” are nothing but activities carried out in order to obtain legitimacy and sta-
bility, as a wide stream of “new institutionalist” research has remarked. We explained
that flying away from difficult problems by attaching them to another choice opportu-
nity simply means postponing decision-making, and we added another plausible means
for escaping from difficult problems, namely, buck-passing.
Our extensions have been made possible by the fact that we implemented the GCM
as an agent-based model. We already stressed that this has been a straightforward
operation, since the the original verbal description of the model fits perfectly with the
agent-based technology.
Our extended GCM suggests that flights — both by postponement and by buck-
passing — are beneficial to the organization, since they avoid that the members of an
organization waste their time with problems that they cannot solve. This conclusion
may strike as paradoxical, because it suggests that self-centered behavior might be
beneficial to the organization as a whole. On the contrary, the general practice is that
organizations encourage the identification of individual values with collective values.
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A parallel may be made with markets, where selfish profit-oriented behavior is ben-
eficial to the provision of private goods, and yet altruistic values are necessary for the
provision of public goods. The underlying idea is that self-centered behavior is good
so far an individual displays his abilities, though altruistic values are necessary in order
to hold together a framework where individual abilities can operate. Likewise, flights
serve organizations so far they channel the most difficult problems to the best problem-
solvers, creating opportunities for them to display their abilities. However, this obser-
vation should not be brought to the point of encouraging any kind of selfish behavior in
the belief that this will improve an organization’s effectiveness. Such an advice would
destroy organizations, and this is not the content of a model of organizational choice.
Indeed, at first sight the GCM questions the very rationale of organizations. So
when Padgett [14] and Carley [3] [2] endowed the GCM with hierarchies with rigid
communication channels, they found lower levels of efficiency with respect to the pure
“organized anarchy” of the basic model. However, we went beyond this result. In fact,
we found that the most efficient structure for the GCM is neither the kind of hierarchy
suggested by common sense, nor the “organized anarchy”.
The original GCM had already established that most problems are solved at low
hierarchical levels, whereas the participants at high hierarchical levels make themselves
busy with decisions by oversight. In our extended GCM we offered an interpretation
of decisions by oversight as activities aimed at obtaining legitimacy, which explains
why this sort of activities is mostly carried out by top managers. In fact, if legitimacy
is obtained by conforming to rituals and procedures expected by institutions and peers,
then we are dealing with activities that are best carried out by the representatives of an
organization.
The GCM also posits that different people have different abilities in solving prob-
lems. Consequently, common wisdom suggests that on top of hierarchies should sit the
most able members of an organization. However, the GCM forces us to ask ourselves
what their ability should consist of. In fact, if decisions by oversight are important for
obtaining legitimacy, then one may suggest that top managers should be good at obtain-
ing legitimacy rather than at solving problems. So one may speculate that organizations
should possibly be designed on the basis of criteria that are apparently opposite to those
suggested by common wisdom, namely, leaving those who are good at solving prob-
lems at the bottom of the hierarchy while promoting the poorest problem-solvers to the
top. This possibility did exist in the original GCM, but it was not explored by Cohen,
March and Olsen.
Although we pictured decisions by oversight as a valuable and useful activity, we
endorsed Cohen, March and Olsen’s criterium of organizational efficiency, which is
based on the idea that decisions by oversights should be as few as possible. According
to a series of indicators based on this criterium, a hierarchy where the best problem-
solvers are at the bottom really turned out as the most efficient arrangement. In fact,
this organizational arrangement reaches the highest ratio of decisions by resolution to
decisions by oversight if both flights by postponement and flights by resolution are
allowed, and in this arrangement flights are most effective in limiting the number of
decisions by oversight that must be made at high hierarchical levels. Finally, it is in
the incompetent hierarchy with both kinds of flight that the impression of meeting the
same problems again and again is strongest.
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On the whole, our simulations suggest that it makes sense to have poor problem-
solvers at the high hierarchical levels, particularly if decisions can be easily postponed
and difficult problems can be easily passed on to other participants. However, incom-
petence at problem-solving should not be confused with incompetence tout court. Top
decision-makers should be good at gaining legitimacy for their organization, which is
possibly the kind of ability they should be selected for.
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